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Abstract 
Over the past three decades Germany has repeatedly deregulated the law 
on temporary agency work by stepwise increasing the maximum period 
for hiring-out employees and allowing temporary work agencies to con-
clude fixed-term contracts. These reforms should have had an effect on 
the employment duration within temporary work agencies. Based on an 
informative administrative data set we use hazard rate models to examine 
whether the employment duration has changed in response to these re-
forms. We find that the repeated prolongation of the maximum period for 
hiring-out employees significantly increased the average employment du-
ration while the authorization of fixed-term contracts reduced employment 
tenure. 
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1 Introduction 
Whether temporary agency work can improve the labor market outcomes 
of the unemployed has recently become the subject of both policy and re-
search interest. It is often argued that employment spells in temporary 
work agencies increase workers’ human capital and provide the opportu-
nity to gain work experience. While being on assignment, temporary 
agency workers can develop labor market contacts that lead to stable em-
ployment or at least to longer-term employment (Jahn 2005, Houseman 
et al. 2003). In contrast to this view, it may be argued that human capital 
effects cannot be strong since temporary work agencies primarily offer 
very short low-skilled jobs that are often below the qualification of the 
worker and that temporary agency work provides no significant possibility 
to develop productive job search networks (Segal/Sullivan 1997). Despite 
this objection Zijl et al. (2004) find evidence that temporary agency work 
in the Netherlands substantially reduces unemployment duration and in-
creases subsequent job stability. Studies by Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 
(2005) and Ichino et al. (2006) also find positive employment effects for 
workers in Spain and Italy, respectively, even though these results apply 
most notably for specific labor market groups. García-Pérez and Muñoz-
Bullón (2005) examine to what extent previous experience in temporary 
employment agencies affects workers’ transition rates from unemploy-
ment in the Spanish youth labor market. They show that previous em-
ployment experience in a temporary employment agency reduces unem-
ployment duration and has a positive impact for the short term unem-
ployed on the likelihood of leaving unemployment. The results by Autor 
and Houseman (2005) for the USA and Kvasnicka (2005) for Germany are 
less encouraging. Both studies find no strong support for the stepping-
stone function of temporary agency work.  
One reason for these rather mixed results might indeed be that the em-
ployment duration in temporary agency work, which is strongly regulated 
in most OECD countries by law, is rather short. Regulations, which primar-
ily affect the duration of a temporary work agency contract are the per-
mission to conclude fixed-term contracts, the restriction on the number of 
renewals, the maximum cumulated duration of temporary work contracts 
as well as the maximum period for continuously hiring out employees to a 
single user firm. Even though most OECD countries limit the length or the 
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number of renewals of a temporary agency work contract (OECD 2004), 
only Germany (until 2003), Italy, the Netherlands (until 1999), Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg and Portugal limit the length of an assignment to a 
user firm (Arrowsmith 2006, Storrie 2002). Despite the continuing liberali-
zation of the temporary help sector in most OECD countries over the last 
two decades, up to now, there has been no research regarding the effect 
of these reforms on the employment tenure within a single temporary 
work agency.  
Germany is an interesting case to analyze because its temporary help sec-
tor is still one of the most regulated among the OECD countries. All the 
more because temporary agency employment has substantially grown 
during the past decade with an annual growth rate of 10 percent, see Fig-
ure 1.  
Over the past three decades the German government has repeatedly 
amended the law on temporary agency work. This process of deregulation 
started in 1985. One main focus of these reforms was the stepwise exten-
sion of the maximum period for hiring-out employees. Furthermore, in the 
mid 90s temporary work agencies obtained permission to conclude fixed-
term contracts with their employees. All reforms were designed on the 
one hand to increase employment stability within the temporary work 
agency. On the other hand the deregulation was meant to increase flexi-
bility and encourage firms to recourse to temporary agency workers rather 
than to internal adjustment instruments such as overtime when adjusting 
to variations in output demand. To some extent the strictness of the Ger-
man regulation of temporary agency work might be responsible for the 
relatively small share of these workers to total employment when com-
pared to other European countries. Nevertheless these legal changes 
should have had an effect on the employment duration within temporary 
work agencies. In this paper a mixed proportional hazard rate model is 
used to examine whether the employment duration in the German tempo-
rary help sector has changed in response to these reforms. 
Lack of longitudinal data on individual employment histories for temporary 
agency workers has largely precluded empirical research on the employ-
ment duration of temporary agency workers in Germany. The only avail-
able study by Rudolph/Schröder (1997) merely addressed those aspects 
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on a descriptive basis. Schröder (1997) used event history techniques but 
limited her analysis to 1980-1990 and did not address the question 
whether the employment duration changed in response to the reform dur-
ing her observation period. Brose et al. (1990) examined employment du-
ration in temporary agency work using descriptive statistics but again 
without any special reference to the effect of the reforms.  
Recently an extended version of the IAB employment sample (IABS) has 
become available which now allows the analysis of such questions. The 
data set is of administrative nature and provides longitudinal and high 
quality information on the individual employment and unemployment his-
tory of temporary agency workers covering the reforms between 1980 and 
2003. The central question of the paper is whether the amendments to 
the law affect the employment duration with a temporary work agency 
and whether the employment duration varies according to socio-economic 
characteristics. We do not address the question whether these legal 
changes have had an effect on the stepping-stone function of temporary 
agency work. The reason is that on average 30 percent of all temporary 
agency workers in Germany were out of the labor force prior to entry in 
temporary work agencies. For these workers we can not differentiate 
whether they accept agency work as a conscious choice to work in a dy-
namic environment or as a means to find permanent stable employment. 
Restricting our analysis to temporary agency workers who were previously 
unemployed would partly solve this problem but would heavily affect our 
results on employment duration. 
The paper is organized as follows. The legal framework and the develop-
ment of the temporary help sector in Germany are described in Section 2. 
Section 3 outlines our main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data, dis-
cusses the explanatory variables and provides an explorative analysis. 
Section 5 is devoted to our estimation strategy and the results. Section 6 
presents the results of our sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Temporary agency work in Germany 
By international standards, the German labor market is highly regulated 
(OECD 2004). One consequence is that Germany is suffering from a high 
and still increasing unemployment rate while economic growth is modest. 
In contrast, the German temporary help service industry has reasonably 
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steadily grown for the last three decades. The number of temporary 
agency workers increased from 47,000 in 1980 to about 454,000 in 2005, 
see Figure 1. Despite an average annual growth rate of about 9 percent 
between 1980 and 2005, the share of temporary agency workers reached 
only 1.2 percent of total employment in 2005. Nevertheless, the actual 
labor market flows give the temporary agency work sector an even 
greater importance than any stock figure or its share would suggest. In 
2005 on average about 444,000 workers were employed by the temporary 
help service industry but 738,000 new temporary work contracts were 
concluded and 724,000 terminated. Therefore the dynamics of this labor 
market segment are all but negligible. 
Figure 1: Development of the temporary help sector since 1973, Germany 
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Reforms of the 
Labor Placement Act
Source: Labor Placement Statistics, Federal Employment Agency
 
Various reasons for the rising demand for temporary agency workers have 
been proposed. These include the reluctance of firms to increase their la-
bor force on a permanent basis during the economic cycle and idiosyn-
cratic variation of output demand in particular; reduction of labor costs to 
circumvent the wages bargained in sectoral collective agreements; sav-
ings in direct labor costs, including continued payment of wages for sick-
ness; reduction in administrative costs and immediate responses to sud-
den changes in work requirements. Firms also use temporary agency work 
to circumvent the relatively strict German employment protection legisla-
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tion. The primary advantages are claimed to be that employment con-
tracts may be terminated without notice, firing costs can be reduced and 
labor disputes can be avoided. Last but not least the stepwise deregula-
tion of the quite strict regulation of temporary agency work may be one 
reason for the expansion of the temporary agency work sector. 
In Germany, temporary agency work is regulated by the Labor Placement 
Act, which came into force in 1972. Since then, agencies must register 
and receive authorization by the German Federal Employment Agency. 
Legislation on temporary agency work has been amended repeatedly over 
subsequent years. Some of the changes were tentative at the outset, see 
Table 1. 
In most countries temporary agency work is associated with a fixed-term 
contract. In contrast, Germany allowed temporary agency work at first 
only on the basis of an open ended contract. During periods without as-
signment the temporary work agency is obliged to continue wage pay-
ments and contributions to the social security system. The maximum pe-
riod of assignment to the user firm was limited to three months. In this 
way, several successive assignments should be combined to a long lasting 
and stable employment relationship between the temporary agency 
worker and the temporary work agency. Furthermore, client firms should 
be prevented from substituting regular employees by temps. In order to 
prevent temporary work agencies from circumventing legal regulations 
concerning the requirement of an open ended contract, legislation on tem-
porary agency work included a ban on re-employment and a ban on syn-
chronization. The ban on re-employment prohibits the agency from termi-
nating the contract and then repeatedly re-employing the worker within a 
three-month period. This regulation permits a one-time termination and 
re-employment. However, this rule does not apply if the worker quits. The 
ban on synchronization requires that the employment contract to exceed 
the length of the initial placement. As a rule of thumb, case law deter-
mined that this requirement is fulfilled if the employment duration ex-
ceeds the first assignment by at least 25 percent. This rule does not apply 
if the first assignment is followed by a second (short) assignment. 
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Table 1: Major Reforms of the Labor Placement Act 
Period Regulation 
Expected effect 
on employment 
tenure 
from May 1, 1985 Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client 
firm from 3 to 6 months until December 31, 1989, prolongation 
in 1990 until 1995 
positive 
from Jan 1, 1994 • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client 
firm from 6 to 9 months until 2000, 
• Elimination of the synchronization ban for hard-to-place un-
employed assigned by the Federal Employment Agency 
positive 
from April 1, 1997 • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client 
firm from 9 to 12 months, 
• Acceptance of synchronization of initial assignment to a 
client firm and employment contract with the temporary 
agency worker, 
• Acceptance of a one-time fixed-term contract without objec-
tive reasons, 
• Renewal of fixed-term-contracts with the same temporary 
agency worker is possible if the new contract follows the 
previous contract immediately 
negative 
from Jan 1, 2002 • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client 
firm from 12 to 24 months, 
• Principle of equal treatment after 12 months 
no effect 
from Jan 1, 2003 • Elimination of the synchronization and re-employment ban 
and the maximum period of assignment to a client firm, 
• Liberalization of the ban of temporary agency work in the 
construction sector, 
• Principle of equal treatment, unless a collective bargaining 
agreement specifies otherwise 
negative 
Source: Jahn (2004) 
 
In the following years, a number of legal reforms were passed. The maxi-
mum period of assignment was expanded from three to six months in 
1985, from six to nine months in 1994 and again in 1997, this time from 
nine to twelve months. In 1997 fixed-term contracts and the synchroniza-
tion of the first contract between an agency and a temporary worker were 
allowed. A fixed-term contract could be prolonged or renewed three times 
until the total employment duration added up to 24 months. The option to 
renew a fixed-term contract was later restricted by the Act on Part-Time 
and Fixed-Term Contracts in 2001. Accordingly, such contracts had to be 
open-ended after a first limited contract period unless the personal char-
acteristics of the worker or objective reasons, as e.g. the replacement of 
an employee on maternity leave, justified otherwise.  
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In 2002 the maximum period of assignment increased up to 24 months. 
From the 13th month of an assignment on, the principle of equal treat-
ment applied. The temporary agency worker had the right to the same 
remuneration and equivalent working conditions as comparable employees 
directly employed at the user firm. 
The Labor Placement Act was again modified in 2003.1 Since then, the 
temporary work agency has been allowed to assign an agency worker 
without any time limits. The ban on synchronization and the ban on re-
employment were abolished. However, fixed-term contracts continued to 
be regulated by the provisions of the Act on Part-time and Fixed-term 
Contracts. At the same time, the rights of temporary agency workers were 
further strengthened as the principle of equal treatment was in effect from 
the very first day of an assignment. This can be avoided by the agency for 
up to 6 weeks if the hired employee has previously been unemployed. In 
this instance, the temporary work agency is permitted to remunerate the 
worker with a net pay rate equal to the recent unemployment benefits. 
The contracting parties may also circumvent the principle of equal treat-
ment if a sectoral collective agreement applies. As a result numerous col-
lective agreements were concluded in the temporary work sector during 
2003. Consequently, the principle of equal treatment has no practical ef-
fect for most temporary agency workers. In addition, the new legislation 
governing temporary agency work established a new instrument of active 
labor market policy. Starting in 2003, the public employment service has 
used subsidized temporary agency work as part of its job placement ac-
tivities. The aim of the so called “Personnel-Service-Agencies” is to get the 
unemployed back into regular work by transition through temporary 
work.2 
                                                
1  The reform of 2003 guaranteed a transition period of one year for the temporary work 
agencies. A detailed description of the development of the Labor Placement Act is 
given in Jahn (2002). 
2  Since 2003 each local employment agency has been obliged to establish at least one 
Personnel-Service-Agency. For details on the characteristics of this instrument of ac-
tive labor market policy, see Jahn/Ochel (2005). 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2006   
 
 
12
3 Hypotheses 
Given that our data set covers the period from 1975 to 2004, we are able 
to examine the effects of the reforms of the Labor Placement Act since it 
came into effect. Due to the stepwise prolongation of the maximum period 
of assignment we expect the duration of the assignment periods to have 
increased. As a consequence employment duration with the agency should 
have increased for the following reasons. In order to minimize periods 
without assignment, and therefore the staffing costs, temporary work 
agencies have an incentive to conclude employment contracts that do not 
exceed the assignment period with the client firm. This strategy is first of 
all of benefit when there are fluctuations or uncertainties with respect to 
the demand for their services, and secondly, if user firms request special-
ized workers, for which the temporary work agency can hardly find a sub-
sequent assignment with similar qualification requirements, and third if 
user firms occasionally request a large contingent of workers. In the latter 
case, a temporary work agency will not search for suitable workers until a 
specific request is on-hand. Such workers will then be hired specifically for 
that request on a temporary basis. 
Until 1997 it was the aim of the Labor Placement Act to prevent the syn-
chronization of the employment contract with the first assignment. Never-
theless, several legal loopholes allowed the temporary work agencies to 
circumvent the principle of open-ended contracts. For instance, a tempo-
rary work agency could easily dismiss and re-employ a worker once within 
the probationary period of six months. After an interruption of three 
months re-employment was possible. Furthermore, a renewal of the em-
ployment contract was allowed if the previous one had been terminated at 
the request of the worker herself. Moreover, the ban on synchronization 
did not prohibit a very short assignment of e.g. one day’s duration after 
the primary one. In doing so, the agencies could circumvent this regula-
tion as well. Therefore we hypothesize that the employment duration at 
the temporary work agency rarely exceeded the assignment periods. 
The Dismissal Protection Act allows the employer to dismiss an employee 
during the probationary period with a notice period of two weeks without 
requiring justification. As a result, temporary work agencies were essen-
tially free to terminate all contracts within the trial period. Given that the 
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probationary period was equal to or longer than the maximum period of 
assignment prior to 1994, most temporary work agencies might have 
taken advantage of the opportunities of the Dismissal Protection Act. Con-
sequently, we expect that the employment duration increased significantly 
due to the reform in 1985. 
In 1994 the government again raised the maximum period of assignment, 
this time from six to nine months. As soon as an employment contract ex-
ceeds the probationary period, the termination of a contract requires a 
justification. If the demand for a temporary worker is longer than six 
months firms can circumvent employment protection legislation by re-
questing a temp. Thus we propose that the demand for temps should have 
increased. However, hiring a temp is expensive due to a mark-up factor of 
2.5 on gross wages. The advantage of temporary agency work for the cli-
ent firm lies primarily in the immediate adjustment to unexpected fluctua-
tions in product demand (Bellmann 2004, Boockmann/Hagen 2001). If a 
firm expects a long-term increase of additional staff, it may be more eco-
nomical to directly recruit a temporary worker. As a rule of thumb the 
breakeven point at which it is cheaper to hire a temporary worker is ap-
proximately six months (Schröder 1997). Thus, we suppose that the sec-
ond reform had a positive effect on the employment duration with the 
agencies as well. However, we expect the impact to be less pronounced 
than that of the reform in 1985. 
In 1997 the maximum period of assignment was extended up to 12 
months. Given that even today most placements still last less than six 
months, this deregulation is unlikely to have fundamentally increased em-
ployment duration (Bellmann et al. 2003, Kvasnicka 2004). In addition, 
the synchronization ban was relaxed by allowing temporary work agencies 
to conclude a fixed-term contract for the duration of the first assignment. 
Therefore, it is not likely that the third extension of the maximum period 
of assignment had a prolonging effect on the employment duration. The 
overall effect of this reform on employment duration might even have 
been negative. 
The maximum period of assignment was again extended in 2002, this 
time from 12 to 24 months. As mentioned before, if a client firm has a 
need for additional staff for such a long period it may be cost minimizing 
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to hire staff on a fixed-term basis instead of repeated recourse to tempo-
rary agency work. The principle of equal treatment which applied from the 
13th month of an assignment on may also not have encouraged longer 
employment periods because it increased the cost of temporary staff. 
However, the overall effect of this reform remains ambiguous as well, and 
we do not expect a noticeable effect on employment duration. 
The recent reform in 2003 nearly abolished all regulations and left the pa-
rameters of the employment contract subject to collective bargaining. 
Therefore we expect a pronounced reduction of employment duration. Our 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. 
4 Data and definition of variables 
4.1 Data 
We use an extended version of the IABS, which permits analyses at the 
individual level3. The IABS contains a two percent random sample of all 
German employees registered with the social security system. Supple-
mentary information on registered unemployment spells at the employ-
ment office is added to the sample. Being of administrative nature the 
IABS provides longitudinal and high quality information on the employ-
ment and unemployment history of employees. Temporary agency work-
ers are identified by an industry classification code, which allows us to 
identify those workers covered by the social security system in profes-
sional temporary work agencies. Firms that place their employees only on 
a sporadic basis (so-called mixed firms) can not be identified by this code. 
Therefore about 87 percent of all placed temps in our sample are included 
in the analysis (Jahn/Wolf 2005). The missing information on temporary 
agency workers employed in mixed firms has no effect on our results be-
cause the reforms of the Labor Placement Act are likely to affect primarily 
the employment behavior of professional agencies. 
                                                
3  The original IABS records data for the period 1975 to 2001. By adding employment 
spells of individuals included in the original data set administered by the Federal Em-
ployment Agency for 2002 to 2004, the re-form of 2003 can be analyzed as well. A 
description of an earlier version of the data set can be found in Bender et al. (2000) 
and Hamann et al. (2004). 
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Each employment and unemployment spell contains starting and ending 
date and provides accurate information on the timing of transitions from 
temporary agency work to another labor market status. Using an inflow 
sample over the period 1980 to 2003 with censoring on December 2004, 
we can investigate and compare the effects of the five reforms between 
1985 and 2003. For administrative reasons approximately 85 percent of 
the employment spells are updated for 2004. We suppose that register 
information is particularly incomplete for new employment relationships. 
To avoid any distorting effects we therefore excluded all spells starting in 
2004. The reference to employment spells rather than workers implies 
that temporary agency workers with multiple completed temporary agency 
spells within the same firm or with another employer in a given period are 
included repeatedly. If a temporary agency spell is followed by a new spell 
without interruption at the same employer employment duration of these 
two spells are added. 
Nevertheless, the IABS also has disadvantages. First, temporary agency 
workers cannot be distinguished from the permanent administrative staff 
of the agencies, which accounted for about 7 percent in 2003 (Jahn/Wolf 
2005). Second, as the source of the employment data is social security 
administration records, no information on the number and duration of 
placements and the client firm is available. Finally, as long as a jobseeker 
is not registered with the employment agency or at the social security sys-
tem, their employment history is interrupted. That implies that, although 
a worker might be looking for a job but is not registered with the em-
ployment agency, the jobseeker will be considered as out of the labor 
force. 
Information for East Germany is available since 1992. In order to investi-
gate the effect of the reform in 1985 as well we concentrate our analysis 
on West German workers. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to full-
time employees aged between 15 and 64. Contrary to the US, temporary 
agency jobs in Germany rarely are second jobs. Due to lack of information 
on the number of hours worked, we exclude part-time employees, train-
ees, interns and home-workers. In light of the low number of cases, we 
exclude temporary agency workers in agriculture and mining as well. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2006   
 
 
16
4.2 Definition of variables 
Our dependent variable is the employment duration within the temporary 
work agency. The five regulatory regimes are coded as dummy variables. 
Temporary agency work contracts still in effect on the date of legal change 
are attributed to the preceding period, as we assume that the specific con-
tract is influenced by the legal framework in place while concluding the 
contract.  
To identify the reform effects we control for individual characteristics as 
well as for macroeconomic variables. As macroeconomic variables we use 
first, the real annual growth rate of the GDP, as the demand for tempo-
rary agency work varies with the economic cycle, second, dummy vari-
ables at the regional level indicating the tightness of the regional labor 
market, and finally, the average annual unemployment rate.4 All macro-
economic indicators are attributed at the end of a spell because we as-
sume that the prolongation of a contract might depend on the actual mac-
roeconomic environment. 
As socio-demographic variables, sex, age and nationality are available but 
no valid information on the family composition and the marital status. To 
measure the skill level of temporary agency workers we use the variable 
education and vocational training. We define three categories: without vo-
cational training, with vocational training and with a university degree. In 
addition we coded the potential work experience. 
Although our data set provides rich information at the individual level, we 
assume that there is unobserved heterogeneity, such as in motivation and 
social skills, influencing individual job stability. We use the recent em-
ployment history as a proxy to control for these characteristics. The IABS 
distinguishes between periods of employment and registered unemploy-
ment. There may be no notification in the data set for persons that have 
previously been outside the labor force, for pupils and students on vaca-
                                                
4  A description of the estimated index of the regional labor market tightness can be 
found in Blien et al. (2005). As the index is correlated with the regional unemployment 
rate we included the time varying annual unemployment rate for West Germany. We 
estimated our models with the lagged GDP growth rate as well. But the lagged GDP 
variable is not significant. This is plausible because the increase in demand for tempo-
rary agency workers is seen as a leading macroeconomic indicator. 
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tion work, persons currently fulfilling a military service, self-employed and 
jobseekers that are not registered with the employment agency. We coded 
these persons as well as workers without a notification for more than 30 
days before entrance into temporary agency work as not in the labor 
force. In addition, we used the categories previously registered as unem-
ployed, employed in temporary agency work, and otherwise employed. 
Employment duration in a temporary employment agency may not only be 
influenced by the regulatory framework but also by other reasons for ter-
minating employment. Our data set contains no information on whether 
the worker or the temporary employment agency has terminated the em-
ployment relationship. Particularly workers who have found a regular job 
after the temporary agency work spell may have quit the temporary job. 
As a proxy for the termination decision of the worker we include in our 
sensitivity analysis in Section 6 a variable indicating whether a worker has 
found a regular job within 30 days after leaving the temporary work 
agency. 
In addition we control for the following job variables: The occupational 
status is an indication of which assignments a temporary agency worker 
may be best qualified for. We can distinguish between unskilled blue-collar 
workers, skilled blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. It might be 
assumed that this classification corresponds closely to the level of educa-
tion. However, the data only show a slight correlation between these two 
variables. A temporary agency worker may have vocational training, but 
due to a previous period of long term unemployment or lack of employ-
ment experience, he might be placed as an unskilled blue-collar worker.  
The IABS provides detailed information on the predominant occupation. 
Because the activities of a temporary agency worker may vary between 
assignments, we use a broad classification und differentiate between six 
occupational groups: Technical occupations (engineer, mathematician, 
chemist), with high skilled workers, service and clerical occupations. 
Manufacturing occupations are divided into three variables for the follow-
ing reason: In Germany there is some indication that especially the metal 
industry (e.g. automobile and aircraft industry) uses temps to circumvent 
the high bargained wages in this industry. Therefore we first of all pool 
typical occupations used in the metal industry in the dummy variable 
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“manufacturing occupations in metal branch”. According to our assump-
tions these workers are used as substitutes for regular workers and should 
therefore have longer employment spells. Second, we aggregate laborers 
without specific occupation, which belong to the manufacturing occupa-
tions as well, in a separate dummy variable.5 The remaining workers are 
aggregated in the variable other manufacturing occupations. We expect 
that especially temps working as laborers and in service jobs do not re-
quire long training periods and should have therefore short employment 
duration. 
In order to control for human capital we included the remuneration of the 
temporary agency workers. Wages are censored by the social security 
contribution ceiling. Since the remuneration of temporary agency workers 
in Germany is very low and gross wage differentials between temporary 
agency workers and regular employees are approximately 41 percent 
(Jahn/Rudolph 2002) it is likely that this limit is of no impact for our 
analysis. A consistent consumer price index for the observation period is 
not available. Therefore we deflated the wages by the GDP deflator. Spells 
with implausibly low daily wages and spells with wages above the social 
security contribution ceiling are excluded. We do not observe information 
on the type of contract, that is whether a worker holds an open-ended or 
a fixed-term contract.  
To account for heterogeneity among the agencies, we included the size of 
the temporary help agency. The capability of a temporary work agency to 
deal with short-term demand shocks depends on the number of its client 
firms and on the extent of diversification between the clients’ economic 
branches. Thus, there will most likely be a positive correlation between 
the firm size and the job stability in the respective firm. Some temporary 
work agencies are specialized in market niches that primarily employ uni-
versity graduates. We hypothesize that such specialized temporary work 
agencies will provide employment contracts of longer duration. In order to 
account for this effect, we defined the variable fraction of employees with 
a university degree within the temporary work agency. 
                                                
5  One might expect that there is a close positive correlation between unskilled blue-
collar workers and laborers. But it turns out, that the correlation is rather weak. 
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Changes of covariates during a temporary agency spell are not reported 
as soon as they take place. Therefore, we use the covariate values at the 
beginning of a spell and assume that they are time invariant.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the inflow of all temporary 
agency workers given in our data from 1980 to 2003 differentiated by 
socio-economic characteristics. The corresponding median employment 
duration during the respective regulatory regimes can be found in Table 3. 
The data refer to employment spells; right censored spells are included. 
We are able to identify 50,241 temporary agency workers and 91,160 
temporary agency work spells in total; 1,446 temporary agency spells are 
censored. This leads to an average of 1.8 temporary agency work spells 
per person during our observation period and may be an indication that 
temporary work agencies indeed are able to terminate an employment 
contract at the end of an assignment and to rehire a worker when a new 
client request is at hand. 
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Table 2: Sample statistics of explanatory variables in %, West Germany 
 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1993 
1994-
1996 
1997-
2001 2002 2003 
Sex (Male) 74.8 76.4 76.6 72.2 73.4 74.1 
Nationality (Non German) 9.9 14.9 24.8 24.1 19.3 18.7 
Age (Average in years) 29.4 29.9 30.6 31.1 31.7 32.5 
 15-24 39.9 37.6 32.3 32.8 30.8 28.0 
 25-34 33.7 34.9 38.2 34.6 33.4 34.3 
 35-44 18.1 17.8 19.0 20.4 22.6 22.5 
 45-64 8.3 9.8 10.5 12.3 13.1 15.1 
Education and vocational training       
 No vocational training 19.1 21.6 25.5 30.6 26.9 22.0 
 Vocational training 78.4 75.8 70.3 64.6 68.3 73.6 
 University degree 2.5 2.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 4.4 
Occupational status       
 Unskilled blue-collar worker 38.8 45.1 54.1 60.9 63.7 62.2 
 Skilled blue-collar worker 40.7 37.4 30.2 20.1 19.8 22.0 
 White-collar worker 20.4 17.5 15.6 19.0 16.5 15.9 
Occupation       
 Technical 3.0 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.9 
 Manuf. other 19.4 12.5 10.3 8.6 8.4 9.0 
 Manuf. metal 39.2 41.3 33.5 23.3 19.2 20.8 
 Laborer 9.8 16.1 26.2 34.6 39.8 38.8 
 Service 10.9 12.6 14.7 15.6 17.7 17.3 
 Clerical 17.7 15.0 13.4 16.3 13.7 12.2 
Previous labor force status       
 Unemployed 24.2 23.8 31.2 28.6 33.5 42.8 
 Regular employed 21.9 21.2 15.4 17.2 15.5 13.5 
 Employed in TAW 12.4 14.3 13.7 17.3 21.1 23.2 
 Not in the labor force 41.4 40.7 39.7 36.9 29.9 20.5 
Regular employed after TAW 32.6 38.2 35.4 33.2 23.7 21.2 
Still in TAW spell after … months in %       
 1  68 75 77 74 67 65 
 3  37 47 51 46 42 40 
 6  20 27 33 28 26 25 
 9  13 18 24 20 19 17 
 12  9 13 17 15 13 13 
No. of spells 6,451 23,654 12,321 34,024 7,004 7,706 
No. of individuals 4,542 15,155 9,112 22,086 5,528 5,859 
Source: IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
Table 2 shows that most temporary agency workers are male. This is true 
for our entire observation period. The proportion of non-German workers 
nearly doubled from 10 percent to 19 percent. Compared to the share of 
non-German workers in overall employment, which amounted to 7 percent 
in 2003, ethnic minorities are overrepresented in temporary agency work. 
With respect to the age distribution of temporary agency workers, we find 
the well known international pattern (e.g. Storrie 2002). The age group 
below 35 years is clearly over-represented. However, their proportion de-
creased appreciably from 74 percent between 1980 and 1984 to around 
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62 percent in 2003. This is primarily attributable to the decline of the 
share of the age group from 15 to 24, which decreases from 40 percent to 
28 percent during our analysis period. The fraction of workers aged 45 to 
64 nearly doubled up to 15 percent in 2003, but they are still underrepre-
sented compared to their proportion of total employment (33 percent in 
2003). Workers without vocational training, who usually are on short-term 
assignments, are over-represented in temporary agency work compared 
to their share in overall employment. Workers with a university degree are 
less likely to be in temporary agency work. 62 percent of all temporary 
agency work spells in 2003 are done by unskilled blue-collar workers, 
while the fraction of skilled blue-collar workers had nearly halved since 
1980. Two thirds of all temporary agency workers are employed in manu-
facturing or as laborers. This pattern has been stable since 1980, even 
though service jobs have become more important in the last few years. In 
2003 one among five temps has been previously out of the labor force and 
is probably only loosely attached to the labor market. Due to the economic 
down-turn beginning in 2001 the share of the previously unemployed in-
creased markedly from nearly 29 percent between 1997 and 2001 to 43 
percent in 2003. Whereas about 22 percent of temporary agency workers 
were previously otherwise employed before 1985, this proportion declined 
to about 14 percent in 2003. The reform of 1997, which permitted fixed-
term contracts and relaxed the synchronization ban, generated a sudden 
increase in temporary agency workers previously employed in temporary 
agency work from about 14 percent before 1997 to 17 percent between 
1997-2001 and even 23 percent after 2003. Table 2 shows that only 
67 percent of the temporary agency workers who started their jobs in 
2002 are still employed one month after entry and only 13 percent one 
year later. Obviously employment tenure in temporary agency work is 
rather short. 
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Table 3: Median employment duration in months, West Germany 
 1980-1984 
1985-
1993 
1994-
1996 
1997-
2001 2002 2003 
Total 2.0 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 
Sex            
 Male 1.9 2.7 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 
 Female 2.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Nationality            
 German 2.0 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.3 2.2 
 Foreign 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.7 
Age            
 15-24 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 
 25-34 2.0 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.0 
 35-44 2.4 3.4 4.4 3.5 2.5 2.5 
 45-64 2.5 4.0 4.9 4.1 3.1 2.7 
Education and vocational training            
 No vocational training 1.5 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 
 Vocational training 2.1 3.1 3.6 3.1 2.5 2.2 
 University degree 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.0 2.9 3.5 
Occupational status            
 Unskilled blue-collar worker 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 
 Skilled blue-collar worker 2.2 3.4 4.3 3.9 2.8 2.7 
 White-collar worker 3.1 4.8 5.4 4.1 4.1 3.6 
Occupation            
 Technical 3.8 6.1 7.3 7.7 6.4 8.8 
 Manuf. other 1.5 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.7 
 Manuf. metal 2.2 3.2 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.6 
 Laborer 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.7 
 Service 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 
 Clerical 3.0 4.4 5.2 4.0 4.1 3.4 
Previous labor force status            
 Unemployed 2.7 3.5 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.1 
 Regular employed 2.2 3.1 4.0 3.0 2.8 3.6 
 Employed in TAW 1.9 2.7 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.9 
 Not in the labor force 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Regular employed after TAW 2.6 3.8 4.9 4.0 3.5 2.9 
No. of spells 6,451 23,654 12,321 34,024 7,004 7,706 
No. of individuals 4,542 15,155 9,112 22,086 5,528 5,859 
Source: IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
Table 3, which shows the median of the employment duration, confirms 
that the employment tenure in temporary work agencies of two to three 
months is indeed very short. These figures are roughly consistent with 
earlier findings in the Netherlands and other western European countries 
(Zijl et al. 2004, Dekker/Kaiser 2000). Lane et al. (2003) show that tem-
porary agency workers in the US had a median tenure of six months, 
Segal/Sullivan (1997) estimate an average of about six months as well. 
Moreover Table 3 shows that employment tenure is increasing with the 
maximum period for hiring out employees until 1994-96. This is totally in 
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line with our hypothesis. After the marked deregulation in 1997 and 2003 
the median tenure decreases again. Note, that we receive this pattern for 
all socio-economic variables. 
5 Empirical strategy and estimation results 
5.1 Econometric model 
In order to identify the reform effects a Difference in Difference approach 
could be an estimation strategy. The purpose is to estimate the causal ef-
fect of an intervention by comparing differences in outcomes before and 
after the change for groups affected by the intervention (temporary 
agency workers) to the same difference for unaffected groups (regular 
workers). In this case we have to assume that hiring and firing of regular 
workers and therefore their employment tenure is not affected by the 
changes in the law. But this assumption is too strong because client firms 
use temporary agency workers among other reasons to screen workers 
and to circumvent employment protection legislation for regular workers 
(Autor 2003, Houseman et al 2003). In an environment with strict regula-
tion of temporary agency work, these workers would probably have been 
hired on a regular contract. An indication that client firms have indeed 
changed their hiring strategy at the margin is the increasing demand for 
temporary agency workers in Germany since 1980, which goes hand in 
hand with the deregulation of the Labor Placement Act, see Figure 1. 
A second estimation strategy to estimate the effect of the legal changes 
on employment dynamics in temporary agency work is to adopt a hazard 
rate model.6 To identify the effects of the changes in the law we included 
macroeconomic covariates as well as individual covariates as described in 
Section 4. In our context, the model specifies the transition rate out of 
temporary agency work. Since our longitudinal data set contains daily flow 
information on employment episodes, we use a continuous time model. 
We do not differentiate between various destination states and therefore 
adopt a single risk framework. The hazard rate ( )th  is defined as the rate 
at which an individual exits from a state, given the individual survived 
there until time t. For the transition out of temporary agency work we use 
                                                
6  See Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) for an introduction to survival analysis. 
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a mixed proportional hazard model for multiple-spell data (van den Berg 
2001, Hamerle 1989). The vector of explanatory variables is denoted by x, 
the baseline hazard by ( )tλ . The influence of the observed characteristics is 
given by 
(1) ( ) ( )β'exp0 xxh = . 
To control for neglected covariates not given in our data set we introduce 
an unobserved heterogeneity term denoted by ν . Thus, the mixed propor-
tional hazard model is denoted by 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) νλν ⋅⋅= xhtxth 0, . 
The multiplicative heterogeneity term ν  is assumed to be constant across 
different spells of a given individual and to follow the Gamma distribution 
as proposed in Abbring/van den Berg (2006). For the sake of identifiability 
we assume the unobserved heterogeneity to have a mean of one and a 
finite variance θ . As ν  is unobservable, it cannot be estimated by the 
data. It is integrated out and only the variance θ  is estimated and given 
in our results.7 
For the baseline hazard rate we adopt a piecewise constant exponential 
model (see Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002). To gain flexibility we split analysis 
time during the first year of each episode into weekly intervals. Within 
each interval, the baseline hazard is constant as it follows the exponential 
distribution. From the 13th month on we split the time axis into monthly 
intervals as the number of observations lasting longer than one year is too 
little to continue the weekly intervals. 
The splitting of the time axis can be described as follows: 
(3) Lττττ <<<<= ...0 321 . 
Assuming that the point in time ∞=+1Lτ  and Ll ,...,1= , we get L intervals 
with 
(4) { }1| +<≤= lll ttI ττ . 
                                                
7  A description of hazard rate models with unobserved heterogeneity implemented in 
Stata can be found in Gutierrez (2002) and Cleves et al. (2002). 
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We now introduce a vector of period-specific coefficients denoted by α . 
These are constant throughout the respective interval. Equation (1) there-
fore changes to 
(5) ( ) ( )βα 'exp0 xxh += . 
The coefficients are estimated by a maximum likelihood method using the 
Newton-Raphson algorithm. The estimates are presented in hazard ratio 
form which means a value below one indicates a covariate with a prolong-
ing effect on employment duration. 
5.2 Results of the legal changes on employment duration  
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the reform dummies and the 
observable covariates. Compared to the reference period 1980-1984, the 
transition rates out of temporary agency work in Model 1, which is our 
preferred specification, differ significantly and are lower after the first 
(1985) and second (1994) change in the law. This is in line with our hy-
pothesis in section 3. Obviously the prolongations of the maximum period 
of assignment have increased employment duration in temporary agency 
work. We take the longer employment duration as an indication that the 
strict regulation may have dampened the demand for temporary agency 
workers by the user firms. Although user firms primarily request temps for 
a short time period there may be a critical time period, until a temp has 
accustomed herself to the new job and is productive in the user firm. The 
prolongations of the maximum period of assignment might have improved 
the chances for the client firms to amortize the initial transaction costs. 
The transition rate after the reform of 1997 which allowed fixed-term con-
tracts and relaxed the ban of synchronization is significantly higher than 
the transition rate of the previous regime. This result confirms our hy-
pothesis in Section 3 as well. It is likely that the temporary work agencies 
have transferred the risk and the costs associated with periods without 
assignment to the temporary agency workers and, if they are eligible, to 
the unemployment insurance system. 
Surprisingly, the reform in 2002, which introduces the principle of equal 
pay after being on assignment for 12 months and increased the maximum 
period of assignment up to two years, went hand in hand with a further 
reduction in employment duration. With respect to our hypotheses in Sec-
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tion 3 this result is unexpected and may be explained as follows: Tempo-
rary agency work has long been subject to controversial discussions in 
Germany. The trade unions have been particularly vociferous in opposition 
to the flexible employment type. The objections were based on the gen-
eral absence of collective bargaining agreements on temporary agency 
work in Germany prior to 2003. Furthermore critics of temporary agency 
work express concern about the quality of flexible jobs. Temporary agency 
work is said to be associated with a lack of training possibilities and oppor-
tunities for career advancement. Consequently, there normally are long 
and controversial policy debates before a new legislation comes into ef-
fect. At the same time, the temporary help sector is seen as highly flexible 
and adjusts to legal changes without delay. We therefore presume that 
this is an anticipation effect resulting from the most recent reform that 
came into effect in 2003 and left regulation of the temporary help sector 
subject to collective agreements. Expert interviews with temporary help 
agencies have confirmed this presumption. In 2003, when collective 
agreements were successfully bargained, agencies systematically termi-
nated ongoing contracts, which were concluded under the former legal re-
gime and re-employed workers afterwards. 
As expected the transition rate after the reform of 2003, which abandoned 
nearly all regulations and left regulation of the temporary help sector sub-
ject to collective agreements, increased markedly. This result is expected 
and confirms the hypothesis in Section 3. 
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Table 4: Exit rates of temporary agency workers, West Germany 
 Model 1 Model 2a) Model 3 b) Model 4 c) Model 5 d)
Reform period (ref.: 1980 – 1984)      
 1985 – 1994 0.723*** 0.796*** 0.733*** 0.724*** 0.730*** 
 (-16.48) (-15.72) (-16.27) (-16.46) (-15.99) 
 1994 – 03/1997 0.660*** 0.751*** 0.668*** 0.660*** 0.665*** 
 (-17.44) (-16.32) (-17.33) (-17.42) (-17.14) 
 04/1997-2001 0.690*** 0.816*** 0.674*** 0.690*** 0.690*** 
 (-17.45) (-13.43) (-19.15) (-17.44) (-17.50) 
 2002 0.790*** 0.934*** 0.742*** 0.790*** 0.778*** 
 (-9.26) (-3.62) (-12.03) (-9.26) (-9.82) 
 2003 0.872*** 1.042** 0.814*** 0.872*** 0.848*** 
 (-5.24) (2.14) (-8.13) (-5.23) (-6.29) 
Sex (male) 1.070*** 1.133*** 1.076*** 1.070*** 1.055*** 
 (4.98) (13.41) (5.61) (5.00) (3.95) 
Nationality (foreign) 1.106*** 1.111*** 1.096*** 1.134*** 1.094*** 
 (7.57) (12.18) (7.19) (5.75) (6.76) 
Potential work experience 0.973*** 0.985*** 0.976*** 0.973***  
 (-14.59) (-11.69) (-13.80) (-14.53)  
Age (ref.: 15-24)      
 25-34     0.917***
     (-6.29)
 35-44     0.776***
     (-16.00)
 45-64     0.706***
     (-18.39)
Education (ref.: no vocational  
training)      
 Vocational training 0.991 1.094*** 0.990 0.988 1.009 
 (-0.72) (9.99) (-0.81) (-0.93) (0.72) 
 University degree 1.149*** 1.276*** 1.138*** 1.128*** 1.273*** 
 (4.87) (12.02) (4.68) (3.80) (8.34) 
Log. deflated daily wage 0.327*** 0.334*** 0.337*** 0.327*** 0.334*** 
 (-78.17) (-98.60) (-77.52) (-78.07) (-76.62) 
Occupational status  
(ref.: white-collar worker)      
 Unskilled blue-collar worker 1.212*** 1.187*** 1.189*** 1.214*** 1.195*** 
 (6.18) (7.19) (5.70) (6.17) (5.73) 
 Skilled blue-collar worker 1.125*** 1.094*** 1.114*** 1.121*** 1.109*** 
 (3.66) (3.63) (3.44) (3.54) (3.23) 
Occupation (ref.: manuf. other)      
 Technical 0.718*** 0.729*** 0.734*** 0.720*** 0.722*** 
 (-7.59) (-9.45) (-7.25) (-7.54) (-7.47) 
 Manuf. metal  0.869*** 0.870*** 0.876*** 0.869*** 0.872*** 
 (-8.18) (-11.25) (-8.00) (-8.20) (-8.02) 
 Laborer 0.911*** 0.902*** 0.918*** 0.910*** 0.918*** 
 (-5.43) (-8.00) (-5.09) (-5.45) (-4.98) 
 Service 0.904*** 0.882*** 0.908*** 0.903*** 0.912*** 
 (-5.38) (-8.92) (-5.25) (-5.42) (-4.92) 
 Clerical 0.862*** 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.862*** 0.882*** 
 (-4.36) (-5.66) (-4.42) (-4.36) (-3.69) 
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Table 4 (continuation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Previous labor force status  
(ref.: unemployed)      
 Otherwise employed 1.030** 1.031*** 1.036*** 1.030** 1.051*** 
 (2.27) (3.01) (2.79) (2.27) (3.85) 
 Employed in TAW 1.146*** 1.274*** 1.161*** 1.146*** 1.167*** 
 (10.46) (22.98) (11.61) (10.46) (11.83) 
 Out of the labor force 1.156*** 1.172*** 1.157*** 1.156*** 1.136*** 
 (13.15) (18.38) (13.48) (13.13) (9.94) 
Termination by the employee     0.797***
     (-24.50)
Firm size 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (-18.68) (-23.60) (-18.42) (-18.65) (-18.25) 
Fraction: employees w. univ. degree 0.805** 0.912 0.880 0.811** 0.850* 
 (-2.56) (-1.41) (-1.54) (-2.47) (-1.93) 
Growth of GDP (West) 1.022*** 1.025*** 1.018*** 1.022*** 1.026*** 
 (7.53) (10.90) (6.37) (7.53) (8.88) 
Unemployment rate (West) 0.941*** 0.911*** 0.948*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 
 (-14.25) (-27.90) (-12.74) (-14.22) (-14.21) 
Interactions      
 Univ. degree * unskilled  
 worker    1.085  
    (1.33)  
 Foreign * unskilled worker    0.963  
    (-1.47)  
 Previously out of the labor  
 force * age (15-24)     1.075***
     (3.92)
ln(θ) 0.405*** 0.340*** 0.405*** 0.404***
 (-63.53)  (-67.17) (-63.52) (-63.91) 
AIC 110,670 125,140 105,527 110,671 110,220 
No. of observations 91,160 91,160 90,469 91,160 91,160 
Note: a) model without control for unobserved heterogeneity, b) model excluding observations last-
ing longer than 5 years, c) model including interactions, d) model with age groups and termi-
nation by the employee. 
Further controls: potential work experience squared, firms size squared, regional dummies. 
z-statistics in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, .10 levels, respectively. 
Source: IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
Figure 2 shows the predicted survival functions based on Model 1. In the 
respective graphs consecutive legal regimes are compared over the first 
365 days of employment duration in temporary agency work. For com-
parison we depict the survival function of the reference period as well. As 
indicated by the estimation results the strongest prolongation occurred 
after the reform of 1985. The highest employment duration and the be-
ginning decline following 1997 are reflected in the second graph. Finally, 
the survival probabilities of contracts concluded in 2003 show only small 
differences to those concluded between 1980 and 1984. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2006   
 
 
29
Figure 2: Predicted survival functions for an average individual 
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Source: IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
5.3 Covariate effects 
The transition rates out of temporary agency work for male workers do 
significantly differ from that of female workers. Model 1 in Table 4 shows 
that the transition rate out of temporary agency work for ethnic minorities 
is higher. One reason might be that they are not well informed about their 
legal rights and it is therefore easier for the agencies to circumvent legal 
regulations. This presumption is confirmed if we calculate the number of 
consecutive contracts for ethnic majorities (1.9) which is higher than that 
of the German workers (1.8). Potential work experience increases the em-
ployment duration in temporary agency firms. It is reasonable to expect 
that temporary workers with long job experience will be easier to place 
than new entrants, who intend to gain their initial work experience in tem-
porary agency work. 
One might expect that workers with higher qualification levels will be as-
signed to positions that require a longer time to become fully proficient at 
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the job at hand. In this case the length of an assignment and thus the du-
ration of the contract period should increase. The estimation does not con-
firm our expectation that vocational training lengthens the duration of 
employment as the coefficient is not significant. At first sight it may be 
surprising that the employment duration of temporary workers with a uni-
versity degree is shorter than that of the reference group. This initially 
unexpected result is explained as follows: The temporary agency work 
market in Germany is highly segmented. Large temporary work agencies 
predominantly place unskilled and seasonal workers. However, some tem-
porary work agencies specialize in particular industry sectors and specific 
market niches that primarily require university graduates. This includes 
specifically skilled workers in information technology, engineers and, most 
recently, also economists, who process complete projects with a limited 
time horizon. We hypothesize that such specialized temporary work agen-
cies will provide employment contracts of durations that are well above 
average. In order to account for this effect, we used the variable fraction 
of employees with a university degree in a temporary work agency. The 
use of this variable is based on the hypothesis that temporary agency 
workers with university degrees employed in temporary work agencies of 
this type are more likely to obtain assignments that match their qualifica-
tion. The results show that the hazard ratio of this variable indeed indi-
cates a significant prolonging effect. However, university graduates with 
degrees, for example, in philosophy or performing arts who work for non-
specialized temporary work agencies at levels below their qualification 
must accept a shorter employment spell. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the duration of a temporary agency job 
does depend on the previous labor force status. The reference group is the 
prior unemployed. Employment duration for workers coming from regular 
employment is shorter. Probably they bridge the gap between two jobs. 
For workers with immediate prior experience in temporary work agencies 
we would expect a longer employment spell. But the estimation results 
show that the employment duration is shorter. One reason might be that 
temps who have repeatedly accepted temporary agency jobs have devel-
oped productive job search networks and quit as soon as they have found 
regular employment. The employment duration of temps coming from out 
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of the labor force is significantly lower. The reason may be that they are 
only loosely attached to the labor market. 
In order to include the heterogeneity of the temporary work agencies, be-
yond the fraction of university graduates among its employees, our re-
gressions include firm size. Large temporary work agencies can pool jobs 
across client firms more easily. Therefore they can offer workers more 
stable employment, even if specific assignments with client firms are tem-
porary. The employment duration indeed increases with the size of the 
agency. The transition rates out of temporary work are sensitive to busi-
ness cycle fluctuations and are higher in tight labor markets with low un-
employment rates. This result is in line with the study of Zijl et al. (2004) 
and may be attributed to a stepping-stone effect. 
Table 5 shows the predicted survival probabilities for an average person in 
our data set. The probability of staying employed in an agency for a given 
time rises until 1997. From that year on survival probabilities start to de-
cline again. We also simulated this development for females, for foreign-
ers and for workers with a clerical occupation. As already noted before, 
female workers or those with a clerical occupation experience more stable 
employment relationships in agency work. The reverse is true for foreign 
agency workers. 
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Table 5: Predicted survival probabilities in %, West Germany 
 1980-1984 
1985-
1993 
1994-
1996 
1997-
2001 2002 2003 
Average persona       
 1 month 69.5 76.9 78.7 77.8 75.1 72.9 
 3 months 31.3 43.1 46.4 44.8 39.9 36.3 
 6 months 10.4 19.5 22.5 21.0 16.8 13.9 
 12 months 1.4 4.5 5.8 5.1 3.3 2.3 
Female           
 1 month 70.8 77.9 79.6 78.8 76.1 74.0 
 3 months 33.1 45.0 48.2 46.6 41.8 38.2 
 6 months 11.7 21.1 24.2 22.7 18.3 15.4 
 12 months 1.7 5.2 6.7 5.9 4.0 2.8 
Foreign           
 1 month 67.2 75.0 76.9 76.0 73.1 70.7 
 3 months 28.0 39.8 43.2 41.5 36.6 33.0 
 6 months 8.4 16.7 19.5 18.1 14.2 11.6 
 12 months 0.9 3.3 4.5 3.9 2.4 1.6 
Clerical occupation           
 1 month 70.7 77.8 79.5 78.7 76.0 73.9 
 3 months 33.0 44.8 48.1 46.5 41.6 38.0 
 6 months 11.6 21.0 24.1 22.6 18.2 15.2 
 12 months 1.6 5.1 6.6 5.9 3.9 2.8 
Note: a) The average person is calculated by the sample averages given in the period 1980 to 
1984. 
Source: IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
6 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to investigate the effect of different model specifications we per-
form a number of sensitivity analyses, see Model 2 to 5 in Table 4. In all 
specifications the effects of the reforms are robust. Model 2 tests whether 
we receive different results if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. Table 
4 shows that the estimations of the last two reform dummies change. 
Compared to Model 1, the hazard ratios of the respective reform periods 
increase. This is an indication that we have indeed to deal with unob-
served heterogeneity of the workers and that hazard rates are overesti-
mated if unobserved heterogeneity is neglected. The decision to include 
an unobserved heterogeneity term is also supported by the lower Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the significant heterogeneity term in col-
umn 1 (Cleves et al. 2002). 
Our data set includes the permanent administrative staff. However, we 
assume that their employment duration are not affected by the reforms 
and that their contract duration should on average last longer than those 
of the temporary staff. In Model 3 we therefore exclude observations last-
ing longer than five years. Again, the hazard ratios change only in size. 
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The specification is extended by interaction terms in Model 4. As a proxy 
for highly qualified workers who are on assignments that are well below 
their educational level an interaction term for university degree and the 
occupational status unskilled worker is included. This dummy yields no 
significant effect. Furthermore, we presume that particularly unskilled for-
eign workers have a weak labor market position, see Section 4, and 
should therefore have shorter employment duration. To test this hypothe-
sis we included an interaction term for this group as well. Again, our esti-
mations show no significant effect. 
One shortcoming of our administrative data set is the lack of information 
on the reasons for job terminations. Therefore we cannot identify whether 
a temp has been dismissed or has quit the job. However, the reform ef-
fects we analyze are assumed to influence the behavior of the temporary 
work agencies and not that of their employees. To circumvent this short-
coming Model 5 assumes that a termination by a temp occurred if we ob-
serve a direct transition into regular employment. Model 5 replaces the 
potential work experience by age groups as well. The reason is that 
younger temps are often recruited among students or pupils, who use 
agency employment to bridge the vacation gap. As they intend to end 
their employment relationship after a predefined short time period any-
way, we assume that regulatory changes hardly affect their employment 
duration. The results of Model 5 support that assumption as all the age 
groups above 24 yield significantly lower hazard rates. 
To test whether the results are robust with respect to the chosen time in-
tervals we estimated Model 1 with monthly and two-weekly intervals re-
spectively instead of weekly intervals. These estimations (not presented in 
Table 4) confirm that the reform effects do not change due to different 
time intervals8. 
7 Conclusions 
Most OECD countries have liberalized the regulation of temporary agency 
employment over the last two decades. To our knowledge, up to now 
there has been neither national nor international research regarding the 
                                                
8  The results are available on request. 
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changes in employment duration of temporary agency work accompanying 
these changes in the law. We used a mixed proportional hazard rate 
model to estimate the changes following the reforms of the Labor Place-
ment Act in Germany since 1980. The stepwise deregulation of the legal 
framework governing temporary agency work in Germany was intended to 
let firms respond more quickly to changes in output demand. The rapid 
growth of the temporary help sector in Germany has raised concerns be-
cause many view temporary agency jobs as “bad jobs”. Our first key find-
ing is that labor turnover in the temporary work agency sector is indeed 
remarkably high. There is also some indication that temporary agency 
jobs increasingly lead to a repeating cycle between temporary jobs. Con-
sequently, employment in temporary work agencies normally is only a 
short transitory period in the employment histories of the workers. It of-
fers employment options particularly for male workers and disadvantaged 
groups, notably for poorly qualified workers, unemployed persons, for-
eigners, and young workers and is primarily used in manufacturing. 
Our second key finding is that there are sizeable changes in the employ-
ment duration of temporary agency workers after the changes in the La-
bor Placement Act, which are in line with our theoretical predictions. As 
expected, the first two reforms, which increased the maximum period of 
assignment, have had a positive impact on the length of employment in 
temporary work agencies. When fixed-term contracts were allowed and 
the synchronization ban was relaxed in 1997 the average employment du-
ration dropped markedly. Obviously agencies shifted the risk of not being 
able to place a worker in a user firm to the temporary agency worker or 
the unemployment insurance system. This may have increased the pre-
carious situation of temporary agency workers that many opponents 
feared. On the other hand the change in the law may explain why tempo-
rary agency work has increased in Germany as much as it has since 1997. 
Obviously client firms have responded to the stimuli by increasing their 
demand of temporary agency workers. But we do not know yet whether 
these are additional jobs or whether firms have substituted regular with 
flexible jobs. Surprisingly, the reform in 2002, which introduced the prin-
ciple of equal pay and increased the maximum length of assignment, was 
followed by a reduction of the employment duration as well. We presume 
that this is an anticipation effect resulting from the most recent reform 
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that came into effect in 2003 and left regulation of the temporary help 
sector subject to collective agreements. The exit rates out of temporary 
agency work for workers with a relatively weak labor market position as 
non-German workers, low skilled workers with no education, and the 
youngest age group are very high. The previous state in the labor market 
has a significant effect on employment duration. Workers who prior to 
temporary agency work were not in the labor force leave the temporary 
help sector more quickly than workers coming from employment or un-
employment. 
The evidence from our study provides insights into the potential important 
role of different kinds of regulation on the employment stability within the 
temporary help sector and we believe the subject warrants further re-
search. One important question is whether the changes in the law have 
affected the transition of unemployed workers into regular work. We leave 
this issue for the moment subject to further research. 
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